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CONTROL OF ELECTRIC RATES IN
NORTH CAROLINA*
FRANK

W.

HANFT**

WHY RATE CONTROL?
The strenuous effort the Roosevelt administration is making to
raise the price level has put state utilities commissions in a puzzling
position. One of the chief reasons why the public wants such state
commissions is that they are expected to keep utility prices down.
The people have by no means abandoned this attitude toward the'
commissions. The inconsistency between the New Deal policy of
price boosting and a state policy of dragging down one set of prices
which has remained comparatively high, namely, prices of utility
services,, is commonly ignored. Cross purposes in government are
likely to produce futility. When the New Deal has passed the experimental stage, and the price level has reached some degree of stability, either on a high plane under the influence of the national program, or on a lower plane in spite of that program, then the task of
adjusting utility rates to the price level can be undertaken with less
danger of neutralizing one policy with another.
Apart from the present emergency and the necessity for coardinating remedies, it is usually admitted that it is necessary for the
state to police the bargain between electric companies and their customers and to fix the price. What is the reason? The majority of
the people have an answer ready-when a state commission lowers
rates it saves the customers money. However, those who receive the
rates are deprived of the money, and the people as a whole have
neither gained nor lost. The shift from the pockets of the rate receivers to those of the rate payers may be a good or bad thing from
the standpoint of the welfare of the state, depending somewhat on
* The breadth of the subject prevents a minute treatment of details. This
article reveals the broad outlines of electric rate control, with North Carolina
materials placed against this background. It is hoped that other articles dealing more intensively with particular aspects of rate control may supplement
this panoramic treatment.
Although this article is concerned with control of rates of electric companies, the same problems are commonly presented by control of the rates of
other utilities; hence material concerning other utilities is freely employed.
The writer speaks solely in his capacity as a teacher of law, and nothing
in this article is intended to represent any attitude of the Utilities Commission.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Associate
Utilities Commissioner.
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the uses to which the money is put by the electricity consumer as
compared with the electricity producer. At all events, rate increases
and decreases do not directly swell nor decrease wealth; they merely
distribute purchasing power among the people differently. Why
should the state lend a hand to the utility consumer at the expense of
the producer? The approved answer is that an economic device as
dangerous as electricity itself if uncontrolled, and as beneficent if
controlled, has been introduced into the electrical industry. That
device is monopoly. Commonly each electric company has, and
should have, a monopoly in the business of furnishing current in its
own territory. The reasons for this monopoly are many. Large
fixed capital, slow capital turnover, economies of quantity production,' and economies resulting from eliminating duplication may be
mentioned. Besides, it would be a great nuisance if three or four
electric companies each had a set of poles and wires running along
each street in a city so that the companies could compete with one
another. Each electric concern has a monopoly, then, of a s'3rvice
which has come to be regarded as essential to modern life. In the
absence of rate control the companies would tend to charge prices
just short of those which would drive customers to the use of substitutes for electricity in such numbers as to diminish the net return
to the companies. It is believed that the electricity producers would
thus be enabled, by reason of the absence of competitors offering a
better bargain, to seize for themselves not only most of the benefits
arising from the development of electricity but also most of the
economies resulting from the monopoly fostered by the state in the
industry. It is to protect the consumers from the dangers of monopoly, as well as to insure them a share in its benefits, that the state
2
controls electricity prices.
THE NORTH CAROLINA MACHINERY

In common with most of the states of the union, North Carolina
has established as her principal agency for the regulation of utilities,
including electric companies, a special state body. This organ of the
'Cabot, Rate Making and Rate Regulation (1932) 57 A. B. A. REP. 793,
794.
, For an indigenous denunciation of monopolistic profits received by electrical companies see Salisbury & S. Ry. v. So. Power Co., 179 N. C. 18, 101
S. E. 593 (1919).
" With the exception of Delaware, every state, as well as the District of
Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines and Porto Rico, has a public utilities
commission. Of the commissions within the United States all but seven have
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government has suffered many changes in its name, size, shape, and
functions. It began in 1891 as a "Railroad Commission" of three
members elected for terms of six years by the General Assembly, at
salaries of $2,000 per year. 4 The commission was given powers of
control over railroads, other common carriers, steamboats, canals, and
express and telegraph concerns. 5 It was also made a board of appraisers and assessors for the taxation of railroads.6 In 1899, in
order to expel the commissioners and put in new ones of the current
legislature's choosing, the General Assembly abolished the Railroad
Commission and created in its room the Corporation Commission,
which was the same old commission with a new name and new incumbents.7 These new incumbents were selected by the General
Assembly, but it was provided that in future the commissioners were
to be elected by the voters. 8 The Corporation Commission existed
intact until 1933. During the period between 1891 and 1933 additional utilities were subjected to regulation by the commission. 9
Electrical utilities were brought under its control in 1913.10
Besides control of public utilities the commission has from time
to time possessed an odd mixture of functions. It has had authority
over banks, loan and trust companies, and building and loan assojurisdiction over electric light, heat and power companies.
A
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OF STATE
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PUBLIC

UTILITY

BONBRIMT

ComMIssIoN

& CO.,

REGULATION

(1928) 5, 7. In 1931, Oregon substituted a single commissioner for her commission. Oregon Laws 1931, c. 103.
' P. L. 1891, c. 320. P. L. 1895, c. 133 reduced the salaries to $1500; P. L.
1899, c. 164, §31 restored them to $2000; P. L. 1901, c. 7, §3 added $500 for
duties as tax commissioners; P. L. 1907, c. 994, §2 raised the salaries as corporation commissioners from $2,000 to $3,000; P. L. 1921, c. 25, §1, raised them
to $4,500, at which figure they continued for about a decade. The salaries of
members of the new North Carolina Utilities Commission will be dealt with
hereinafter.
P. L. 1891, c. 320.
'P. L. 1891, c. 323, §§44-52.
P. L. 1899, c. 164 and c. 506; Nichols, Judicial Review of the North Carolina Corporation Commission (1924) 2 N. C. L. Rrv. 69 at 71.

'P. L. 1899, c. 164, §1.

'Telephones, P. L. 1893, c. 512; street rdilways, P. L. 1897, c. 206, §2;
flume companies, P. L. 1907, c. 39, §4; electric light, power, water, and gas,
P. L. 1913, c. 127; water power, hydro-electric power, and water, P. L. 1913,
c. 133, §1; any public-service or quasi-public service corporation other than
steam railroads in any city, P. L. 1917, c. 136, sub-c. 3, §§1-3; sewers, P. L.
1917, c. 194; motor vehicle carriers, P. L. 1925, c. 50, amended and re-enacted
P. L. 1927, c. 136; steam and pipe lines, P. L. 1933, c. 307, §le. P. L. Ex.
Sess. 1921, c. 86 transferred any authority the Corporation Commission may
have had over rates of ferries and toll bridges connecting any state highway
to the highway commission. For a review of the present copious statutory
enumerations of utilities over which the commission has control see (1933) 11

N. C. L. REv. 245.
" See supra note 9.
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ciations, 11 and over industrial banks ;12 it has been constituted a
board of state tax commissioners;l s its chairman has been made a
member of the municipal board of control;14 and of the state board
of assessment;15 and one of its members has been given the duties
of securities commissioner,1 6 with appellate jurisdiction in the Corporation Commission.17 Fortunately, most of the items of this incongruous collection of functions have been transferred to other
agencies. Such a diversity of duties weakens the possibility that the
state will secure or develop men expert in the difficult and highly
specialized work of utility control.
The Corporation Commission was abolished in 1933 and its place
was filled by a single Utilities Commissioner, who succeeded to the
powers and duties of the commission and its individual members.18
The commissioner is to be elected for terms of four years' 9 at an
annual salary of $4,500.20 Two Associate Commissioners are to be
appointed for four year terms,2 1 but they act only when called in to
sit with the commissioner in described cases of an important nature,
and are then paid on a per diem basis. 2 2 Hereafter in this article the
term, "Utilities Commis~ion," will be used to designate the commissioner acting with or without the associate commissioners as the case
may be. The Utilities Commission has powers of control over public
24
utilities, 23 and the duties of Securities Commissioner.
31P.
2

L. 1899, c. 164, §§1, 2.

P. L. 1919, c. 225, §9.
33P. L. 1901, c. 7.

P. L. 1917, c. 136, sub-c. 2, §4.
P'
P. L. 1933, c. 204, §200.

12
P.
1

L. 1925, c. 190; P. L. 1927, c. 149.
P. L. 1925, c. 190, §18; P. L. 1927, c. 149, §18.
1P. L. 1933, c. 134. For a discussion of the new act and its adjustment to
existing statutes see (1933) 11 N. C. L. Rlv. 245.
"P. L. 1933, c. 134, §4. The terms of utility commissioners elsewhere
range from two to ten years. A six year term is most common. Most commissions have three members. Some have five and some seven. Usually they
are appointed by the Governor. In twenty-one jurisdictions they are elected.
Salaries vary from $2,000 to $15,000. The average is $4,000. BONBRIGHT &
Co., op. cit. mcpra note 3, at 15.
P. L. 1933, c. 134, §5. The first regularly elected commissioner goes into
office January 1, 1935. A temporary commissioner appointed for one year took
office January 1, 1934. P. L. 1933, c. 134, §4.
Appointments are to be made. by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. P. L. 1933, c. 134, §11. Two temporary Associate Commissioners are provided for in the act, one to hold office until January 1, 1935,
the other until January 1, 1937. Id. §11. The Utilities Commissioner and his
two associates constitute the Utilities Commission. Id. §9.

"Id. §§10, 11.

See (1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 245.
P. L. 1933, c. 134, §8.
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Either directly or by virtue of its position as heir to the powers
of the Corporation Commission, the Utilities Commission has frequently repeated general statutory authority over the rates of electrical utilities. 25 The rates established by the commission are to be
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931), §1035, gives the Corporation Commission "such general control and supervision as is necessary to carry into effect
the provisions of this chapter and the laws regulating the companies, corporations, co-partnerships and individuals specified herein, over.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

"3. Electric light, power, water and gas companies and corporations, other
than such as are municipally owned or conducted, and over all persons, companies and corporations, other than municipal corporations now or hereafter
engaged in furnishing electricity, electric light, current or power and gas.
"4. All water power, hydro-electric power and water companies," etc.
Such control and supervision is to be the same as that vested in the commission in respect to railroads and other transportation companies. The commission had control of the rates of railroads.
N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1066, specifies: "The commission shall
make reasonable and just rates and charges, in intrastate traffic, and regulate
the same, of and for"3. Persons, companies and corporations, other than municipal corporations,
engaged in furnishing electricity, electric light current, power or gas.' The
section adds that the power vested in the commission by the section shall be the
same as that vested in it in respect to railroads and other transportation
companies.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2783, which embodies a portion of the
Municipal Corporation Act of 1917, gives the Corporation Commission power
to fix rates of public-service or quasi public-service corporations other than
steam railroads in any city. Section 2784 provides that on application the commission is to determine a just or reasonable rate, proceeding under the general
law governing the commission.
P. L. 1933, c. 134, §2, gives the Utilities Commissioner "general power and
control over the public utilities and public-service corporations of the state,
and such supervision as may be necessary to carry into full force and effect
the laws regulating the companies, corporations, partnerships, and individuals
hereinafter referred to (§3 below), and to fix and regulate the rates charged
the public for service."
Section 3 proceeds: "The said Utilities Commissioner shall have general
supervision over the rates charged and the service given, as follows, to-wit:
"3. By electric light, power, water, and gas companies, and corporations
other than such as are municipally owned or conducted, and all other companies, corporations, or individuals engaged in furnishing electricity, electric
light current, power, or in transmitting or selling the same or producing the
same from the water courses of this state;
"4. By all water power and hydroelectric companies or corporations," etc.
Section 3 concludes: "And the said Utilities Commissioner is hereby vested
under this section with all power necessary to ... fix and regulate the reasonable rates and charges," etc.
Section 16 states that the Utilities Commissioner "shall at all times be empowered and required to inquire into such service and rates charged therefor,
and to fix and determine as herein provided the reasonableness thereof."
P. L. 1933, c. 307, §1, defines, for the purposes of the act, the term "public
utility" to include persons and corporations owning or operating equipment for:
"1. Producing, generating, transmitting, delivering or furnishing gas, elec-
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"reasonable and just."26 The process whereby "reasonable and just"
rates are to be determined will be dealt with hereinafter.

Although the Utilities Commission is the principal agency for
regulation of electricity rates in North Carolina, the municipalities
still can, if they will, play an important part. Since the 1905 Revisal,
cities and towns have had authority, "to grant upon reasonable terms
franchises for public utilities.

'27

Rates agreed upon between the

city or town and the utility under or pursuant to these franchises are
subject to change by the state commission, 28 but unless the regulatory
power of the state is asserted, the franchise rates are binding.20 Their
enforceable character as between city and company is not impaired
by the fact that they may be set aside by the state.30 Further, in the

exercise of its authority to fix rates the commission is likely to approve rates for a municipality agreed upon between the municipal
officials and the company. 31 Municipalities may make their weight
tricity, steam or any other agency for the production of light, heat or power
to or for the public for compensation."
Section 8 reads: "Whenever the Commission (Corporation Commission),
after a hearing had after reasonable notice upon its own motion or upon complaint, finds that the existing rates in effect and collected by any public utility
for any service, product, or commodity, are unjust, unreasonable, insufficient or
discriminatory, or in any wise in violation of any provision of law, the Commission shall determine the just, reasonable and sufficient rates to be thereafter
observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order as hereinafter provided."
The effect of this multiplicity of provisions is to befuddle and befog anyone
seeking a statement of the statutory authority of the Utilities Commissioner
over rates of electrical utilities. He finds the statutes full of statements. Here
and there and everywhere the commissioner is given such authority.
0N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§1066, 2784; P. L. 1933, c. 134, §3;
Id. c. 307, §§2 and 8.
27N. C. Riy. STAT. (1905) §2916-6; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§2623-6. Under the present provision the grants are not to exceed the period
of sixty years, unless renewed. The section does not apply to Cumberland
County.

Prior to 1905 cities had no general statutory authority to grant franchises.
Such authority might be given a city in its charter. See Elizabeth City v. Banks,
150 N. C. 407, 64 S.E.189 (1909).
'In re Pet. for Increase of Street Car Fares, 179 N. C. 151, 101 S.E.619
(1919); Corp. Com. v. Henderson Water Co., 190 N. C. 70, 128 S. E.465
(1925).
'Henderson Water Co. v. Corp. Com., 269 U. S.278, 46 Sup. Ct. 112, 70
L. ed. 273 (1925).
10So. Utilities Co. v. City of Palatka, 268 U. S.232, 45 Sup. Ct. 488, 69 L.
ed. 930 (1925).
" Instances in which the Corporation Commission approved rates agreed
upon between municipalities and utility companies are to be found in In re
Pet. of Piedmont Power & Light Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1921-22, Part
1, 71; In re Pet. of Durham Pub. Serv. Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1929-30,
56; In re Tel. Rates in the Town of Apex, N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1913,
Part 1, 256; In re Pet. of Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep.
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felt by initiating or contesting rate hearings before the commission.32
From an adverse decision by the commission the municipality is a
proper party to carry an appeal to the courts. 33
Review by the state and Federal courts, 34 of commission action
in North Carolina has been discussed in this Law Review. 35 The
most obvious defect in our procedure for appeals to the state courts
is the right to a trial de novo in the Superior Cohrt, with the attendant right to a jury trial.3 6 This probably means that the reasonable
ness of rates fixed by the comnmission is a jury question 37 To ask
juries to decide whether rates fixed for large utilities are reasonable
is as unwise as it would be for hospitals to ask juries instead of physisians to diagnose diseases. The reasonableness of utility rates depends
upon factors which a jury simply can not comprehend by reason of
sheer ignorance of the subject. It would take years to educate the
1931-32, 120. Numerous additional instances are to be found in the commission
reports.
Of course where an electric company serves many municipalities, and
charges a uniform rate over the whole system in the states, as two North
Carolina companies do, the possibility of an agreement between municipal officers and the company as to rates is reduced.
I Electric rates were lowered as a result of a proceeding brought by a
municipality in City of Wilmington v. Tide Water Power Co., N. C. Corp.
Comm. Rep. 1931-32, 106.
"In re Pet. for Increase of Street Car Fares, supra note 28.
3'For a treatment of the place of the Federal Courts in utility regulation
see Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 379. The United States Senate on Feb. 6, 1934,
passed a bill, S. 752, which then went to the House. The bill provides that no
Federal district court shall have jurisdiction to enjoin, suspend, or restrain
the enforcement of any order of a state commission nor any action in compliance with such order, where jurisdiction of the Federal court is based solely
on diversity of citizenship, or unconstitutionality of the order under the constitution of the United States, where such order (1) affects rates chargeable
by a public utility, (2) does not interfere with interstate commerce, and (3)
has been made after reasonable notice and hearing, and where a plain, speedy,
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of the state. The act does not
affect pending litigation.
This act is the fruit of long and persistent agitation against interference by
the Federal courts in state utility rate regulation.
Nichols, op. cit. supra note 7.
Id. at 78.
See id. at 82. In Corp. Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 185 N. C. 17, 116
S. E. 178 (1923) the reasonableness of electric rates was submitted to the jury
in the Superior Court. The appeal to the Supreme Court did not involve the
correctness of this procedure, but the court said, 185 N. C. at 23, "On appeal
the decisions and rulings of the commission on the hearing are in no way controlling, and the judge, at the trial of the cause in the Superior Court, must
submit the same to the jury under recognized and approved principles of law."
See also Corp. Comm. v. Henderson Water Co., supra note 28, sustaining a
directed verdict upholding the commission's rates where evidence of the matters to be considered in determining reasonable rates was lacking.
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average juryman to the point where he thoroughly understands what
is involved in the fixing of utility rates. However, it may require a
constitutional amendment 38 to clear our law of this encumbrance left
over from an age when litigation arose from simpler economic
relationships.
CHARTERS AND CONTRACTS

Before the constitutional prohibition against creating corporations
or amending their charters by special act,39 the General Assembly
had granted numerous charters to utility companies giving them
authority to set their own rates.4 0 However, such charter authority
41
does not preclude rate regulation under the power of the state.
Contracts between utilities and consumers setting the price of current
42
are also subject to rate regulation.
"See Nichols, op. cit. supra note 7, at 78, 94.
N. C. CoNsT., Art. VIII, §1. This prohibition became effective Jan. 10,
1917. Prior to that time under Art. VIII, §1 corporations could be formed
under special act "in cases where, in the judgment of the legislature, the object
of the corporations cannot be attained under general laws." The change is set
forth in Watts v. Lenoir & Blowing Rock Turnpike Co., 181 N. C. 129, 106
S. E. 497 (1921).
"The Melrose Power and Manufacturing Co., chartered for sixty years, to
supply light, heat, and power, electrical or otherwise, was authorized to furnish
electric current to drive machinery, "and to fix . . .payment therefor." It
was also authorized to contract for the sale of electricity. Priv. L. 1911, c.
286. The Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., incorporated for sixty years, empowered to supply light, heat and power, electrical or otherwise, was authorized to supply power -and "fix . . . payment therefor." It also was granted
authority to contract for the sale of electricity. "Priv. L. 1909, c. 76. The
Tryon Electric Light, Water & Power Co., incorporated with perpetual succession, was authorized to deal in electricity "for such price ...and on such
terms and conditions as to this corporation may seem proper." Priv. L. 1907,
c. 22. Large numbers of charters contain comparable grants of authority to
the companies to fix rates. Priv. L. 1909, c. 48; Priv. L. 1907, c. 183, 260 and
452; Priv. L. 1899, c. 75 and 160; Priv. L. 1893, c. 314.
"See Griffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N. C. 206, 30 S. E. 319 (1898);
Watts v. Lenoir & Blowing Rock Turnpike Co., supra note 39. N. C. CoNsT.,
Art. VIII, §1 as it existed before Jan. 10, 1917, contained the provision that
the special acts referred to therein could be "altered from time to time, or repealed." The amendment of 1917 appears merely to prevent such alterations
by special legislation. See also Yadkin River Power Co. v. Whitney Co., 150
N. C. 31, 63 S.E. 188 (1908) ; Elizabeth City Water & Power Co. v. Elizabeth
City, 188 N. C. 278, 124 S. E. 611 (1924).
'Union Dry Goods Co. v. Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U. S. 372, 39 Sup. Ct. 117,
63 L. ed. 309 (1919) ; see Corp. Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co., supra note 37.
In the absence of intervention by any public agency having authority to control
rates, the contract rates are binding. Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. L. Banks
Holt Mfg. Co., 183 N. C. 327, 111 S.E. 623 (1922); N. C. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Yadkin Finishing Co., 178 N. C. 546, 101 S.E. 88 (1919).
For a discussion of rates set by franchise contract with a municipality see
text, "The North Carolina Machinery."
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PURPOSES SERVED BY RATE REGULATION: PREVENTION

OF DISCRIMINATION
One of the major objectives of machinery for rate regulation is
to eliminate discrimination. In North Carolina discrimination in
utility rates was illegal at common law. 43 It is now forbidden by
44
statute, and the commission is authorized to prevent it.
Prior to
the act passed in 1933 requiring schedules of rates to be filed with
the commission and forbidding the companies to charge other than
the rates stated in the schedules, 45 the North Carolina Supreme Court
held, where no schedules of rates had been filed with the commission,
that a customer could, without any prior action before the commission, by mandamus compel an electric company to furnish him current at the lowest rates offered any other such customer under substantially similar circumstances. This result was reached notwithstanding the fact that complainant was a distributing company, i.e., a
46
retailer, not a consumer, of electricity.
The most obvious kind of discrimination exists when the same
electric company, either directly or by giving rebates, charges one
customer more than it charges another for the same amount of electricity furnished under the same conditions. Discrimination exists
also when electric rates charged by the same company are too high
in one locality as compared with another.4 7 Perhaps the most diffiGriffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., supra note 41.
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1054; P. L. 1933, c. 307, §§4, 5, 6, 8.
'3

P. L. 1933, c. 307, §§4, 5.
Salisbury & S. Ry. v. So. Power Co., 179 N. C. 18, 101 S.E. 593 (1919);
rehearing denied, 179 N. C. 330, 102 S. E. 625 (1920) ; later appeal, 180 N. C.
422, 105 S.E. 28 (1920).
' An extreme case wherein such discrimination was prevented is Dallas
Power & Light Co. v. Carrington, 245 S. W. 1046 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
Commission decisions reducing rates in municipalities in order to prevent discrimination against them by reason of lower rates offered by the same company
in other municipalities are to be found in City of Laclede v. Laclede Elec.
Light Co., P. U. P, 1925 E 373 (Pub. Serv. Comm. of Mo.); Re Pub. Serv.
Co. of Ind., P. U. R. 1933 B 59 (Pub. Serv. Comm. of Ind.). See also Armstrong, The Municipality as a Unit inRate-Making and Confiscation Cases
(1934) 32 MIcH. L. REv. 289. Such a problem does not arise concerning the
system wide rates maintained by two electric companies in this state, the rates
being the same for all municipalities served.
In Corp. Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co., supra note 37, it was argued by electricity users that rates set by the commission for power in North Carolina
would produce discrimination since the company involved had contracted for
lower rates to South Carolina customers. The court found no facts to support
the argument, but said: [185 N. C. at 30) "Doubtless if it should be made to
appear that a power company.., in an adjoining or other competitive state is
presently and voluntarily making contracts at a substantially lower rate than
here, our Corporation Commission . . .could well decide that such conditions
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cult kind of discrimination to detect and eliminate is present when a
company charges too much for one class of service such as residence
lighting, as compared with others.4 8 All three of the varieties of
discrimination mentioned are. forbidden in this state, and the com49
mission is authorized to eliminate them.
REASONABLE RATEs: THE RATE MAKING

PROcEss

Interest in utility regulation is no longer centered on eliminating

discrimination, but on fixing reasonable rates. Regulation as a whole
is likely to be judged today by its success in this particular.
The statutory requirements for rate fixing in North Carolina and
elsewhere are simple to state but exceedingly hard to achieve. Practically all state statutes, including our own, prescribe in effect that
rates shall be "just and reasonable."' ' 0 Rate schedules must be filed
with the commission, 5 must be strictly adhered to, 52 and may be
changed only on thirty days notice to the commission, unless the
latter decrees otherwise. 53 Whenever the commission of this state,
upon a hearing held after reasonable notice thereof, finds that existing rates are "unjust, unreasonable, insufficient or discriminatory, or
in any wise in violation of any provision of law, the Commission
shall determine the just, reasonable and sufficient rates," and fix the
same by order. The commission may act upon complaint, but it may
also act on its own motion.54
The task of the commission, then, is to make and keep rates "just
and reasonable." How is the commission to know when a rate meets
this simple description? One old, rambling and misty statutory
declaration of the matters to be taken into account by the commission exists.55 It is obviously modeled upon the case of Smyth v.
Amws, 5 6 which sets forth the factors to be considered in arriving at
might fully justify it in establishing such contract rates as reasonable and
just"; i.e., eliminating the discrimination against North Carolina customers by
establishing as the rate here the rate offered the favored customers in the
competitive state.
"This problem is dealt with more fully hereinafter under "Rate Classifications and Forms."

aSupranote 44.
cWN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§1066, 2784; P. L. 1933, c. 134, §3;
P. L. 1933, c. 307, §§2, 8; BONBRIGHT & Co., Op. cit. supra note 3, at 10.
P. L. 1933, c. 307, §4.
G2Id. §5.

BONBRIGHT & CO., Op. cit. supra note 3, at 10.
P. L. 1933, c. 307, §8.
WN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1068.

Id. §7;

169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. ed. 819 (1898).
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reasonable rates. Both the decision and the North Carolina statute
lack clarity, 57 but appear to be groping toward the now familiar
process of rate fixing. The process is as follows:
First, the value of the property of the utility used and useful in
rendering service to the public is determined. To this end both the
statute and Smyth v. Ames include as matters to be considered the
original cost of constructing the property, 58 the amount expended in
permanent improvements, and the present as compared with the original cost of construction. 59 Smyth v. Ames specifically includes the
amount and market value of stocks and bonds of the utility. 60 Both
I The statute prescribes that in fixing maximum rates the commission shall
consider if proved, or may require proof of, "the value of the property of
such . . . corporation used for the public in the consideration of such rate or
charge or the fair value of the service rendered in determining the value of
the property so being used for the convenience of the public." Such language
is an almost :mpregnable barrier to anyone trying to penetrate to its meaning.
Does it mean that the value of the property is to be considered, and that one
fashion in which value of property may be determined is by looking to the fair
value nf its product, that is, the service it renders?
The statute adds, "It shall furthermore consider the original cost of construction thereof and the amount expended in permanent improvements thereon
and the present compared with the original cost of construction," etc. These
latter factors are significant only for their bearing on value, yet they are placed
in the statute in such fashion as to suggest that they are factors to be considered in addition to value.
In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, at 546, [18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. ed. 819
(1898)] appears this language, "And in order to ascertain that value (of the
utility property), the original cost of construction, the amount expended in
permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock,
the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable
earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute,
and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case."
The earning capacity under the prescribed rates, and the sum necessary for
operating expenses, have no bearing on determination of value, but relate to
steps in the process of fixing rates after value is determined.
' Of course if this original cost was extravagantly incurred it may be
scaled down. See Griffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., supra note 41. Original
cost thus qualified amounts to the same thing as the amount prudently invested
in the property.
"That is, the amount it would now cost to build the property. This-is commonly called cost of reproduction.
' The amount of stocks and bonds issued by a utility has little bearing on
the value of its property. The securities may be watered. See Griffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., supra note 41; Salisbury & S. Ry. v. So. Power Co., supra
note 2. Or, more rarely, the property may be worth more than the face value
of securities issued against it.
The market value of the stocks and bonds has a bearing on the value of
the property, but on the other hand rates affect the market value of the stocks
and bonds, and rates are the objective of the valuation. In fixing rates to
consider a factor depending on 'rates would allow existing rates to justify
themselves.
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add a basket clause to catch anything else bearing on value.61 Assume that the commission is fixing the rates for an electric company,
and after due consideration of the mentioned factors and others concludes that the reasonable value of the company's property as it now
stands, considering depreciation, is $100,000.
Second, the rate of return to be allowed on the property must be
determined. Assume that the commission decides that a fair return
to the company on the value of its property is seven per cent. This
means that the company is to be allowed to earn annually 7% of

$100,000 or $7,000.
Third, the commission must decide what rates or charges to the
public for electricity will produce $7,000 a year over and above the
operating expenses of the company, including depreciation, for the
year.
The above process is commonly followed by commissions where
rates are fixed in contested cases. On appeal to the courts it is the
process by which the constitutional validity of the rate fixed by the
commission is tested. If in the opinion of the court the rates will
not be enough to pay a fair return on the fair value of the company's
property over and above operating expenses, then the rates are con62
fiscatory and invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.

e N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, 1931) §1068 states that the commission is to
consider, "all other facts that will enable them to determine what are reasonable and just rates." In Smyth v. Ames, 16 U. S. at 547, is the statement,
"We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property." For some of the matters which have been
taken into account in valuation proceedings see State ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel.
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. ed. 981 (1923)
Brandeis, J., concurring, at 294, especially footnote 6. What factors are considered, and what weight is given each, depends on circumstances. For example, if a utility were built efficiently and an accurate record kept of the
cost, and rates were fixed before any substantial change occurred in the general
level of prices, it would be-proper to use the book cost of the property less
depreciation to determine its value. Book cost would be the same as the amount
prudently invested, and would equal present cost of reproduction of the property. If many years elapsed between the erection of the utility and the rate
proceedings, and the property were not efficiently built, then book cost, prudent
investment, cost of reproduction, and other factors might each lead to a different result, and each factor is to be considered for what the circumstances
show it to be worth.
I Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S.
679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675, 67 L. ed. 1176 (1923). For a recent case supporting, by
an application of the above process, rates fixed by a commission see Los
Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R. R. Comm., 289 U. S. 287,. 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77
L. ed. 1180 (1933).
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STPs IN THE PRocEss: FAIR VALUE

The first step in this process of rate fixing, namely, determination
of the value of the company's property, is the one which has to date
attracted the most attention. Value is a versatile word. Value for
rate making purposes may be one thing; value for other purposes
may be something else. The property of an electric company has at
the same time many values, and these values may or may not be
different in dollars.
When the property of the company is taxed, the value may be
set at a certain figure.6 3 If a municipality takes over the utility the
value may be placed at another figure. The property may also be
valued for the purpose -of determining whether the company is solvent. 64 The value for the purpose of fixing rates may be different
from any of these.
c The North Carolina Corporation Commission has sometimes taken tax
value into account in fixing value for rate purposes. In re Application of the
So. Power Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1921-22, Part 1, 45. But see Corp.
Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co., supra note 37, at 30; Grimes v. So. Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1906, Part 1, 35. Russell v. N. C. R. Co.,
N. C. R. R. Comm. Rep. 1898, Part 1, 163, at 172, contains an argument for
defendant distinguishing tax value from value for rate purposes. The gist of
the argument is that tax values are customarily set below actual values.
In other jurisdictions the relevancy of value for taxation purposes in considering value for rate purposes has been variously treated. One court has
taken the position that the two kinds of value are identical. See Great Falls
Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 34 F. (2d) 297 (D.Mont. 1929)., In other instances value for taxation purposes has been used as the sole evidence of value
in rate cases. See City of Corona v. Corona Home Tel. & Tel. Co., P. U. R.
1915 F 1014, 1023 (Cal. R. R. Comm.). -This is likely to occur where there is
no other evidence of value. Re Chesapeake & 0. Ry., P. U. R. 1917 D 152
(W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm.); Re Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., P. U. R. 1917 F
272 (Kan. Pub. Utilities Comm.). At the opposite extreme stand cases indicating that value for taxation purposes has no bearing at all on value for rate
purposes. Vincennes Water Supply Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 34 F. (2d) 5
(C. C. A. 7th, 1929) ; Re United Traction Co., P. U. R. 1927 D 637 (N. Y.
Dep't. of Pub. Serv.); see Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Billings Gas Co., P. U. R.
1933 D 337, 368 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm.), wherein is a collection of cases.
In Knott v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. (Missouri Rate Cases), 230 U. S. 474, 33
Sup. Ct. 975, 57 L. ed. 1571 (1913), certain railroads attacking state statutory
maximum rates as confiscatory relied on evidence of the value set on their
properties by the state assessing board. The court refused to find confiscation
on the basis of such evidence of value. The court pointed out that. no members
of the board were examined; there was no showing of the grounds for their
judgment of value; and it was not shown that the tax valuations were upon a
basis proper for determining value on the issue whether rates are confiscatory.
Between the cases wherein tax value is used as value for rate purposes, and
cases refusing to recognize tax value at all, are cases considering tax value
along with other evidence of value. Re Kokomo Gas & Fuel Co., P. U. R.
1921 E 390, 394 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm.); City of Lima v. Public Utilities
Comm., 106 Ohio St. 379, 140 N. E. 147 (1922); see Customers v. Worcester
Elec. Light Co., P. U. R. 1927 C 705 (Mass. Dep't. of Pub. Utilities).
SIn Temmer v. Denver Tramway Co., 18 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927),

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The legal requirements for determining value for rate purposes
are artificial. They have to be. Value of property is normally what
the property can be sold for. But one does not go down town to buy
a utility and bring it home. Public utilities are not bought and sold
on the market. Neither can value of a utility plant be fixed by a
normal method of arriving at the worth of a business, namely, capitalization of its earnings. It will not do to value utility property
according to what the utility earns, for what it earns depends on the
rates it charges, and the valuation is being made in order to arrive at
rates. In fixing rates to use a valuation depending on rates is to
caper around a circle. Therefore some more artificial means of determining value must be used in utility rate making. Accordingly
the law has prescribed that value be arrived at by taking into account
factors thought to have a bearing thereon. These factors were outlined in the previous discussion of Smyth v. Ames and its North Carolina statutory offspring. As was pointed out, both that decision and
our local statute specify among the factors the present cost of construction. This means the commission must give some weight to
what it would cost to reproduce the identical utility property at the
time of the rate making. In a long series of cases the United States
Supreme Court held with unbroken regularity that any rate valuation
was confiscatory if it did not take into account cost of reproduction
when that was higher than original cost.65 The court did not state
how much weight had to be given to this factor as compared with
other factors proper for consideration, but the repetition in the decisions that cost of reproduction must be considered tended to cause
commissions to emphasize this factor. This precipitated a tremendous
controversy between economists, lawyers, and others who support
cost of reproduction as a means for or factor in determining value,
and those who believe that more effective regulation of utility rates
the receiver of a tramway company had earlier brought an action for the pur-

pose of increasing rates, and in that action the value of the company's property

was fixed. In the instant case the question of the solvency of the company
arises. It is contended that if the property has the value fixed in the rate
proceeding, then the company is not insolvent. The court held, however, that

value for rate purposes is not the, same thing as value for the purpose of de-

termining solvency. Actual value, says the court, is based on what a willing
buyer ought to pay, and depends on earnings. Such value could not be used
in rate making, for earnings depend on rates, which are the very thing being

determined.
I State of Mo. ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S.
276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. ed. 981 (1923) ; see St. Louis & O'Fallon R. Co. v.
U. S., 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384, 73 L. ed. 798 (1929), and cases cited
279 U. S. at 484.
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would be possible if the legal requirement that cost of reproduction
be considered were abolished or circumvented, and the amount prudently invested in the property were taken as the sole measure of
(or substitute for) value. 66 The controversy is important if for no
other reason than its size, the mass of writing about it, the ardor
shown on both sides, and the present adventures of prudent investment in national politics. 67 Too much has been written on each side
to permit a thorough examination of the material, but some of the
arguments for prudent investment and cost of reproduction will be
summarized.68
PRUDENT INVESTMENT

Those who would substitute prudent investment for value found
according to Smyth v. Ames argue:

1. From the standpoint of legal theory all that the utility owner
has devoted to the public use is a certain amount of capital, and if
he receives a fair return on his outlay nothing has been confiscated.6 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that utilities

are entitled to such rates- as will yield them "a fair return on their investment." Corp. Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co., supra note 37, at 23; In re Pet. for
Increase of Street Car Fares, supra note 28, at 161. These statements are in
all probability mere loose language, not designed to mean that in North Carolina the amount invested in the property is to be substituted for "value" as
prescribed by Smyth v. Ames and N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1068.
Indeed in Corp. Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co., at 31, the court spoke with approval of the fact that the commission followed what is now section 1068.
The court apparently did not have in mind the sharp distinction between return
on investment and return on value as prescribed by section 1068.
In Massachusetts the local commission substituted prudent investment for
the measure of value prescribed by the United States Supreme Court, and succeeded in so doing because the utilities did not take rate cases from the commission to the courts. Goldberg, The Massachusetts Proposalsfor Public Control (1931) 11 B. U. L. Rxv. 54.
"President Roosevelt, in his campaign speech .at Portland, Oregon, Sept.
21, 1933, put forward as one of his proposals for better utility regulation,
"Abolishing by law the reproduction cost theory for rate making and establishing in place of it the actual money, prudent investment principle as the basis
for rate making." See also an article by Dr. Albert Levitt, special assistant
to the Attorney General, Utilities under the New Deal, N. Y. Times, November

26, 1933, at 2 XX.

' Many of the points in this summary were first brought to the writer's
attention in the lectures of Professor Garver of the University of Minnesota.
Most of them are the staples which feed the argument between exponents of
the two theories, and have been repeated over and over. Some of them can
be found in Robinson, Duty of a Public Utility to Serve at Reasonable Rates
(1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 243.
' This argument would be impressive if the investment theory were law at
the time of the building of the utility. But where a utility has been built in
the past, to impose on the owner now a legal rule to the effect that he is not
the owner of property, but of an investment, seems of dubious validity.
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2. When the amount prudently invested in a utility is once determined, no valuation of the company's property will ever again be
necessary. Additions, and replacements of greater cost than the
replaced property, will mean merely an additional investment to be
added to the original investment. On the other hand, where value
depends on cost of reproduction the value changes constantly, and
new valuation proceedings are repeatedly necessary. A valuation
begun now may be obsolete by the time it is completed because meanwhile the price level of labor and materials needed to reproduce the
utility may have gone up or down.70 Frequent valuations mean prohibitive expense and the ill will of the public toward utilities which
rate disputes generate.
3. It is impossible to find out what it will cost to reproduce a
given utility. In rate making proceedings the company's engineers
arrive at a cost of reproduction which is almost always higher than
that arrived at by the engineers representing the public, and sometimes twice as high; the commission commonly arrives at a still
different figure, and the courts on appeal are likely to disagree with
them all and name a new figure. 71 The testimony as to reproduction
costs is supposed to be expert information, is in fact opinion, and
opinions vary so widely that endless uncertainty is introduced into
rate making. This uncertainty in the process, plus the constant necessity for renewed rate fixing as price levels change, with long drawn
appeals 72 to the courts when rates are fixed, has discouraged the bewildered commissions, has killed their initiative, and has made them
reluctant to assert their authority to fix rates.
4. Under cost of reproduction utility stocks are highly speculative. This results from the fact that most of the capital of utilities
' In Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. v. R. R. Comm., 54 Sup. Ct. 154, 158
(1933) the court referred to "the profound changes in values, costs of service,
consumption of commodities, and reasonable return on invested capital which
we judicially know took place during the period of more than five years while
the case was pending before the commission and the court." In the case of
In re Application of the So. Power Co., supra note 63, at 52, the commission
in July, 1921, refused to accept as a rate base an appraisal made by the company engineers according to the cost level of June, 1920, "because the price
level has already receded from it."
7 See State ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 276,
43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. ed. 981 (1923), and the concurring opinion by Brandeis,
J., 262 U. S. at 299, and note 11; City of Wilmington v. Tide Water Power Co.,
.supranote 32.
'In Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Gilbert, 3 F. Supp. 595 (N. D. IM. 1933), rates
fixed by a commission in 1923 were still being litigated. The case was back in
the district court after an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Smith
v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U. S. 133, 51 Sup. Ct. 65, 75 L. ed. 255 (1930).
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is contributed by the bondholders. Assume that a utility is erected
at a reasonable cost of $100,000, and that of this amount $75,000 is
contributed by the bondholders, whose bonds have an interest rate
of 6%. Suppose the commission allows on the $100,000 value a return of 7%. The stockholders receive 7% on all the value resulting
from their contribution, that is $25,000, plus 1% on the $75,000 value
contributed by the bondholders. Now suppose the price level rises
50% so that the cost of reproduction of the utility is $150,000, and
the commission allows a return of 8% on this value. The bondholders still receive only 6% on $75,000. Now the stockholders
receive 2% on that $75,000, plus 8% on an additional $75,000 of
value, although they have contributed only $25,000. Thus it is seen
that tremendous profits are possible to stockholders when cost of
reproduction is made the measure of value. On the other hand, a
severe fall instead of a rise in the price level will wipe out the margin contributed by the stockholders, with the result that the utility
will not earn enough to pay the interest on its bonds, and will be
insolvent. By contrast, the amount prudently invested in the utility,
$100,000, remains the same whether price levels go up or down, hence
under prudent investment utility stocks would not be highly speculative, as they now are to the extent that cost of reproduction enters
into value on which a return is allowed.
5. Since under prudent investment stocks would be less speculative, the average returns which would have to be paid on them in
order to induce investors to buy them would be smaller. Safe, nonspeculative investments attract money at lower rates of return.
COST OF REPRODUCTION

Those who support the position of the United States Supreme
Court that cost of reproduction must be given weight in determining
value, or who approve the practice of some commissions in making
it the measure of value, urge:
1. Cost of reproduction is founded on sounder legal logic. If
the utility does not receive a fair return on the fair value of its
property, then there is confiscation, and property has been taken without due process of law. What property? The property as it now
stands, not money invested prudently or otherwise in the past.
2. When price levels rise and fall, values, including values of
industrial plants, rise and fall. Property rarely remains worth exactly what was invested in it. To make an exception of public utility
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property would mean maladjustment of utilities in the normal industrial order. Some of the points listed separately below are aspects
of this general idea.
3. The return to utility owners is really more stable under cost
of reproduction than it would be under prudent investment. Under
the latter theory, if accompanied by a fixed rate of return on the
fixed investment, the utility owner receives during high price levels
the same number of dollars he receives during low price levels. But
at high price levels he can buy much less with each dollar. He is
poorer despite his fixed income. Under cost of reproduction he
receives more dollars when, prices are up and more dollars are re73
Of
quired to give him the same amount of food, clothing, etc.
course, prudent investment could be accompanied by a sliding rate
of return, going up or down with the price level. But this would
merely mean casting out the legion of devils that now inhabit the
value problem, and allowing them to enter into the rate of return.
4. Cost of reproduction rewards efficiency in construction, since
the utility receives a return on what it would reasonably cost to reproduce the utility, and the return is not limited to what actually
was spent building it. On the other hand, under the investment
theory if the owners exercised extraordinary efficiency and built a
plant which would normally cost $100,000 for only $90,000, they
would receive no advantage, as their return would be limited to the
$90,000 invested. In short, under prudent investment there would
be a falling off of efficiency to the point just short of wastefulness
such as to brand the investment as imprudent.
5. Similarly, cost of reproduction induces utilities to build at
low price levels, whereas prudent investment would impose no penalty on building at high price levels, since in any event a return
would be allowed on the higher investment.
6. Assume a fixed return on a definite amount, namely the
amount prudently invested, is given. Then assume the price level
rises. Utility rates would be low as compared with general prices
since utility rates would not have advanced. The result would be an
abnormal stimulation in demand for the unnaturally cheap utility
service, with attendant unnatural overexpansioh of utility plants, and
I The catch in this argument for cost of reproduction lies in the fact that
most utility capital is contributed by bondholders, and their income is fixed
regardless of the valuation allowed on the utility property. The fluctuations
under cost of reproduction are absorbed by the stockholders. See text argument 4 under prudent investment.
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that at a time when the expansion would be at higher costs. The
abnormal overexpansion would saddle high investments on utilities
on which investments consumers would have to pay a return. Then
when prices fall off, returns on these inflated investments would have
to be paid, with the result that utility rates would be abnormally
high compared with other prices, which would produce an abnormal
contraction of demand. This would result in necessity for still
higher rates to pay the constant return, and the higher rates would
cause demand to dwindle further, etc. An abnormal idleness of utility plants and a cessation of expansion would ensue. Utility regulation would thus become a handicap to the industrial order because
utilities would expand unnaturally during high price periods, thus
tending to heighten booms, and contract abnormally during low price
periods, thereby deepening depressions. 4
7. Public opinion would defeat the operation of prudent investment. If a utility were built largely during boom times, and then the
public were obliged during an ensuing depression to pay returns on
the inflated investment, a political hue and cry would be raised
against the utilities. The people would fail to see why utility investors should continue to enjoy returns on boom time values while
the property of everyone else dwindled in value. This argument is
solidly founded on human nature. During depressions, when prudent investment would result in relatively high utility rates, the public
is most likely to challenge the prices it pays to utilities, just as it
challenges taxes and all other necessary expenditures. Conversely,
during booms, when cost of reproduction results in high returns, the
public, thriving with the boom times, pays less attention to expenditures. It is in a tolerant mood and careless of costs.
If it can be avoided regulation should not take utilities from the
"'This argument can be answered in part by saying that utility rates depend
more on operating expenses than on return to the company, and operating expenses would fluctuate normally though the return were fixed. It may be further said that electrical utilities furnish a service which is essential, hence will
be demanded regardless of price. This is but partly true. Only a small portion of the sales of electricity are free from competition. Electric power must
compete with coal, electricity for cooking must compete with gas and other
fuels, etc. Further, if electric rates are abnormally high, the amount of
consumption per customer will decrease. One may eat his bread untoasted if
electricity is expensive. That demand may decrease sharply during depressions,
notwithstanding the fact that electricity is "essential," is shown in N. C. Corp.
Comm. Rep. 1931-32, XVII, where it is pointed out that mills, factories and
machine shops which normally consume electric power were shut down or running part time. One light and power company reported the loss of 2,869 customers in six minths.
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scheme of things which people acquainted with the fortunes of ordinary business understand.
8. Rates are not uncommonly set separately for each municipality
served, on the basis of the property used to serve that municipality. 5
When this is done, then under prudent investment if the plant in
one municipality were built during high prices, and a similar plant
in a neighboring municipality were built during low prices, the rates
in the second municipality would be permanently lower than those in
the first, thus giving the second an advantage over the first in seeking
new citizens and industries.
THE Two

THEORIES AND PRESENT CONDITIONS

The case for either cost of reproduction or prudent investment is
not wholly convincing. The fundamental difficulty is that our industrial order is part controlled and part competitive. Cost of reproduction represents an attempt to make controlled utilities follow the
fluctuations of a competitive industrial order. Prudent investment
represents a proposal to hold utilities rigid amid the fluctuations of
that competitive industrial order. Neither gives promise of complete
success. Ultimately the truth may be that our industrial system cannot exist as a house divided; it must be all competitive or all controlled. The tendency of the age is in the latter direction.
At all events an imposing phalanx of arguments has been launched
against prudent investment as a solution of the present ills of rate
valuations. Furthermore, prudent investment is no longer alluring
to the rate payer. At the time Smyth v. Ames was decided it was
the representatives of the public who were urging cost of reproduction. When years later the World War sent prices 'skyrocketing, the
utilities joyously seized the argument for cost of reproduction, because it meant expanding value of their properties for rate making.
Many representatives of the rate paying public then took up the case
for prudent investment. If they are not careful they will win their
fight. Previous economic experience makes it possible that the country is facing a long period of lower prices. 76 If so, the utilities are
" This practice was held valid even where a system serves many municipalities in Wabash Valley Elec. Co. v. Young, 287 U. S. 488, 53 Sup. Ct. 234, 77
L. ed. 447 (1933) commented dpon: Armstrong, supra note 47; Note (1933)
18 IowA L. REv. 354; (1933) 2 GEo. WAsir. L. REv. 119.
" See State ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 276,
43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. ed. 981 (1923), Brandeis, J., concurring, 262 U. S. at
303, note 16. Observe how events have fulfilled Justice Brandeis' observations,
made at a lime when political propaganda had spread faith in permanent pros-
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not likely to fight proposals to substitute prudent investment for fair
value as at present determined. Prudent investment would perpetuate returns on the full amount of investments made during the
inflation era.
As the law now stands prudent investment and cost of reproduction are factors to be considered with other factors in valuing utility
property, but the emphasis has been on cost of reproduction. If
despite the New Deal a long continued period of low prices follows
the late depression it will be to the advantage of the rate payer to
keep the emphasis there. In a recent case before the United States
Supreme Court 77 a gas company contested rates fixed by a state
commission. The court, speaking of the company's evidence of cost
of reproduction based on average prices for a period of three years
ending Jan. 1, 1930, first pointed out that the object of finding present value is to make possible a prediction of what the value will be
during the time the rates are in operation (since the rates should pay
a fair return on the fair value). The court then said that cost of
reproduction based on average prices for the above mentioned period,
"furnished no dependable criterion of values in the succeeding years.
The country was facing a most serious decline in prices. It was
entering upon a period of such depression as to constitute 'a new
experience to the present generation.' It was not the usual case of
78
possible fluctuating conditions but of a changed economic level."
The court rejected the cost of reproduction urged by the company as
a basis for finding confiscation. The court further intimated that
values of the company's properties accumulated after 1917 were
higher when the properties were acquired than during the period
after Jan. 1, 1931, when the commission's rates were in effect. 79 The
court's hindsight enabled it to see that cost of reproduction as of
1926-29 was far above present cost of reproduction.
To the extent that cost of reproduction entered into values fixed
during the inflation years those values are now less by the amount of
perity and enduring high prices. It is to be hoped, however, that the economic
policies of the New Deal will modify the causes which would otherwise make
probable a long continued low price period.
'n Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. P. R. Comm., 289 U. S. 287, 53 Sup.
Ct. 637, 77 L. ed. 1180 (1933) noted in (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv, 89 and
(1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv.-64. The case contains an excellent discussion of
much of the law governing rate making.
1289 U. S. at 311. See also Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. v. .. P. Comm.,
54 Sup. Ct. 154, 158 (1933) ; Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Gilbert, supra note 72, at 601.
"' See also Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 54 Sup. Ct. 427,
430 (1934).
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the decrease in cost of reproduction. So far as rates depend on those
values, reductions below the rates charged during the boom years are
obviously justifiable.
LESSER PROBLEMS IN VALUATION

The first step in the orthodox rate making process presents the
large problem above set forth, namely, upon what basis value is to
be determined. It presents also a brood of lesser problems. What
property is to be considered in the valuation? Should an obsolete
plant now used only as reserve equipment for emergencies, or facilities acquired but not yet used, be included?80 How are leases to be
valued ?8 What about franchise value, going concern value,8 2 etc.?
These lesser problems are too numerous to treat here.
STEPS IN THE RATE MAKING PRocEss: RATE OF RETURN

The second step in the procedure for fixing rates, namely, determining the rate of return to be earned on the rate base, has been the
field for a battle of opinions resembling somewhat the conflict over
theories of value. On the one hand are those who urge that the rate
of return should be fixed at a figure depending on the rate the utility
had to offer in order to attract the money invested in it. Opposed to
this fixed and rigid rate of rettirn are those who hold that the fair
rate of return should be determined according to conditions existing
at the time of the rate making. The United States Supreme Court
has made this flexible measure of fair return the legal yardstick.
"A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return on the value of the property... equal to that generally being
made at the same time and in the same general part of the country
" The North Carolina commission refused to include property acquired but

not yet used in serving the public. In re App. of the So. Power Co., supra
note 63, at 53. See also Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R. R. Comm., 289
U. S.287, 311, 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. ed. 1180 (1933), wherein the court excluded the cost of reproduction of a part of certain gas manufacturing facilities
unnecessary in serving the public because the company was now furnishing
natural gas, of which the supply was adequate.
See (1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 359.
' In Corp. Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co., supra note 37, at 30, our court intimated that it is proper for the commission to make an allowance for going
concern value, but that confiscation does not result if the commission refuses
to do so, citing Galveston Elec. Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U. S.388, 42 Sup.
Ct. 351, 66 L. ed. 678 (1922). However, in Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
1. R. Comm., 289 U. S.287, 313, 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. ed. 1180 (1933), the
court reviewed previous decisions on the subject, and made it plain that going
value must be considered, but that there is no formula binding on the commissions for finding going value.
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on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by
corresponding risks and uncertainties." The return should be sufficient to "assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility"
and to maintain its credit. "A rate of return may be reasonable at
one time and become too high or too low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market and business conditions
83
generally."
Rate of return, like value, presents an issue between those who
believe in a fixed, and those who believe in a flexible, standard. It is
easy to see arguments on both sides similar to those advanced for and
against prudent investment and cost of reproduction. Here too it is
doubtful whether a change from the flexible standard adopted by the
Supreme Court to the fixed standard urged as a substitute would
make regulation more satisfactory. It might make regulation easier.
The actual rate of return deemed fair under the flexible rule of
course varies from utility to utility and changes with the times. A
favorite figure approved by the Supreme Court in recent cases is
seven per cent.8 4
STEPS IN THE PROCESS: REVENUES AND OPERATING EXPENSES

The third step in the orthodox rate making process is to calculate
what rates or charges to the public will produce the allowed return
on the value set for the utility property over and above operating
expenses. This means first that the commission must predict what
the revenues under the rates to be fixed will be. Second, it must
predict what the reasonable operating expenses will be. If the cornmission lowers electricity rates, the number of customers will probably increase, as will the amount of current consumed per customer.
Total operating expenses are likely to be increased, but the operating
expense per customer will probably decrease, since a large number
of customers may be served at a lower cost per customer than a small
I Bluefield Water Works Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 679, 692, 43

Sup. Ct. 675, 67 L. ed. 1176 (1923) ; Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R. R.
Comm., 289 U. S. 287, 319, 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. ed. 1180 (1933).
Wabash Valley Elec. Co. v. Young, 287 U. S. 488, 53 Sup. Ct. 234, 77
L. ed. 447 (1933) (electricity) ; Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R. R. Comm.,
289 U. S. 287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. ed. 1180 (1933) (gas) ; Clark's Ferry
Bridge Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 54 Sup. Ct. 427 (1934) (toll bridge rates).
Robinson, supra note 68, at 279, concludes that 6% was the favorite figure in
pre-war cases, and that after a rise to 8% we are working back toward 6%.
In City of Wilmington v. Tide Water Power Co., supra note 32, the North

Carolina Commission fixed rates which it calculated would provide a return
of 8%.
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number. In some cases there is the bare possibility that the lesser
operating cost per customer will more than offset the decrease in
charges per customer, and that the net return per customer will be
increased. A somewhat less remote possibility is that although the
net return per customer is decreased, the increase in number of customers will result in a greater aggregate net return to the company.
In short, it is possible that decreased rates may increase the earnings
of the company.8 5 In most cases this is not true, but the factors
above suggested usually make the percentage of decrease in earnings
of the company less than the percentage of decrease in the rate. Thus
if rates are cut 20%, the decrease in net return is likely to be somewhat less than 20%. Related problems arise when rates are increased. The increase may decrease the earnings of the company;
more likely there will be an increase in earnings, but the percentage
of that increase will lag behind the percentage of increase in rates.
In calculating the operating expenses the question arises as to the
authority of the commission to allow for the purpose of calculating
reasonable rates lesser amounts for certain items of expense than the
amounts actually being spent by the company. To illustrate: if a
company is paying its president $60,000, and the commission believes
that $30,000 would be adequate, may the commission fix rates taking
into account as an operating expense a $30,000 salary instead of a
$60,000 salary? 86 The authority of commissions in the matter of
operating expenses is of great importance, since more than half of
the charge made for electricity goes to meet this item. 87 However,
this subject is such a large one that no attempt will be made to treat
See City of Columbia v. Watts Engineering Co., P. U. R. 1915 B 921
(Pub. Serv. Comm. Mo.). Some of the railroads are beginning to show a
belated recognition of this principle in their passenger rates.
"This problem must not be confused with the question whether the commission may order the company outright to pay the president no more than
$30,000. It was early asserted in a North Carolina opinion that the public is
not to be obliged to pay rates which will meet expenses incurred by inefficient
management. Griffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., supra note 41, 122 N. C. at 211.
1 N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1921-22, 5, shows that at that time 76.76% of the
income of the electrical utilities of the state went to meet operating expenses,
including taxes but not depreciation. Therefore return to the company and
depreciation amounted to no more than 23.24% of the income. This means that
if the commission cut both the return to the company and its allowance for
depreciation in half rates would be reduced thereby but 11.62%. Fair return
on the fair value of the utility properties, although voluminously discussed,
affects rates paid by the public much less than do operating expenses.
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it here, but different aspects of the problem will be reserved for possible discussion in separate articles. 88
RATE CLASSIFICATIONS AND FORMS

When the commission fixes rates which it calculates will produce
the company a fair return on the fair value of its property above
operating expenses it is, of course, necessary to determine how the
charges of the company are to be apportioned among its customers.
Commonly the service of electric utilities is divided into different
classes depending on the use made of the electricity, and different
rates are charged in each class. Thus a particular company may
offer certain rates for residence service, other rates for commercial
lighting, for commercial cooking and heating, for small power, for
large power, etc. Some companies have great numbers of different
classifications; others divide their service into a more limited number of kinds. There is no uniformity in the classifications made by
the various companies. Further, there is a variety of rate forms in
use by the different electric companies. The simplest rate form is
the straight line meter rate, which means a charge of a fixed amount
per kwhr (kilowatt hour), regardless of the amount of current used.
A common form of rate is the block meter rate, under which for the
first block of current the charge per kwhr is a fixed amount, for the
next block a lesser amount, etc. To illustrate: the charge may be 10c
per kwhr for the first 25 kwhr; 8c per kwhr for the next 25 kwhr;
6c per kwhr for the next 50 kwhr, etc. There are a number of forms
of rate based on the maximum demand of the customer at any one
time during the month, which demand may be either estimated or
measured, or may depend on the equipment of the customer. Many
companies add a customer charge to the rate form used, that is, a flat
charge per month to each customer regardless of his demand or actual
consumption. A better practice is to make a minimum charge and to
supply therefor a certain amount of current. Not uncommonly some
form of meter rate, which is a rate depending on amount of current
used, is combined with a demand charge and a customer charge.
The blocks in a block rate may be of different sizes depending on
the company, and the charge per kilowatt hour within the blocks may
' One of the major operating expenses of an electricity distributing company is the charge for current supplied by the generating company. For a
thorough discussion of control of this expense see Erb, Regulating Wholesale
Utility Rates (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 231. Other types of operating expense
are touched upon in Robinson, supra note 68, at 245.
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vary. Thus company A may charge 10c per kwhr for the first 30
kwhr, and company B may charge 8c per kwhr for the first 50 kwhr,
etc. So also the blocks of demand in a demand charge may vary in
size and price per unit within the size. Customer charges likewise
are different. In view of these differences in rate forms from company to company, and of the differences in classification of service,
and of the differences in rate schedules for the various classifications
in the same company, it is easy to see that the number of rates offered
by the different companies is almost endless.8 9
Rate forms and classifications of service present a number of
problems. Discrimination may exist if charges for one class of service are too high as compared with charges for another. For example,
residence rates may be too high, and power rates too low. Further,
charges per kilowatt hour in one block may be too much as compared
with others. Another difficulty is to determine whether changes in
rate schedules are likely to raise or to lower charges to the public.
Rate decreases may be rate increases in disguise. A company may
decrease the charges per kilowatt hour in a number of the blocks of
a block rate, and slightly increase the charges in another block. Then
it turns out that most of the customers use an amount of current
falling within the block where the rate was increased; hence the public as a whole pays more, not less, to the company. For example,
company A may charge for electricity for residence lighting 10c per
kwhr for the first 25 kwhr, 9c per kwhr for the next 25 kwhr, 8c
per kwhr for the next 50 kwhr, and 6c per kwhr for all additional current used per month. Rates may be decreased Ic per kwhr for each
block save the first. The rate for the first block may be increased 3/2c
per kwhr. Then it may prove that the great majority of consumers for
residence lighting use 25 kwhr or less, hence are subject to the Yc increase, and only a few consumers obtain the benefit of the ic decreases. By manipulating classes of consumers and changing the size
of blocks rate increases may be still more effectively disguised by
being made to appear to be largely decreases.
The most serious objection to the great variety of rates offered by
"For a detailed discussion of electric rate forms see EDisoN ELEcTRIC INsvrrumE RATE Boox (1933) VII. The same book contains the principal rates
offered by privately owned utilities in cities of 20,000 or over in the United
States and Canada. WADDELL, PuBLic U'nT RArE STUDIES FOR N. C. Coin.
Comm. (1932), shows the rates offered by four of the large companies oper-

ating in North Carolina.

He points out [at 13] that the Carolina Power and

Light Co. "still has some fifty different schedules in effect."
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different companies, and the lack of uniformity in classification of
service and rate forms, is that it is impossible for the average person
to tell whether the charges of A Company are higher than the charges
of B Company. In order to make the rates from company to company comparable it is necessary to begin with some hypothetical customer using current for a given purpose under given circumstances,
and then calculate from the rates offered by the different companies
how much each would charge this customer per month for certain
quantities of current.9 0 Uniformity of classifications and of rate
forms for each classification would make rates more comprehensible
and comparable.
The final step of the commission in the formal rate fixing process,
after it has determined how much is needed to pay the company a
fair return on the fair value of its property plus operating expenses,
is the above outlined task of apportioning these charges to the public
in the form of rates.
INFORMAL RATE CONTROL: PERFORMANCE OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA COMMISSION

The orthodox process of fixing utility rates as above outlined,
when observed by the commission, results in rates which will stand
the test when challenged in the courts on the ground that they are
confiscatory, provided the commission has succeeded in meeting the
legal requirements governing the steps in the process. However,
commissions commonly determine rates on a much less formal basis.
Where a complaint was made to the North Carolina commission
against the rates of a telephone company, and the commission found
that the company's actual earnings were below a reasonable return
on either the amount invested in its properties or their assessed value
for taxation purposes, the complaint was dismissed. 9 ' Gas rates
were raised on a showing of growing operating expenses and deficits. 9 2 Telephone rates were increased in the absence of objection
where the number of subscribers had grown from 119 to 551 and
the value of the plant had increased. 93 The commission advanced
' Studies made on this basis are referred to infra note 112.
' Grimes v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 63. The Commission also
pointed to defendant's small dividends, testimony that the North Carolina rates
were not remunerative, etc.
So. Gas Improvement Co. v. City of Elizabeth City, N. C. Corp. Comm.
Rep. 1917-18, part 1, 12. The commission recited that it had made a "full investigation and hearing," but mentioned no additional facts.
' Pet. of Piedmont Tel. & Tel. Co., id. at 14. The commission recited that
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gas and street car rates on a showing that increased costs of operation
were wiping out net earnings, and that necessary additioiis and extensions could not be made in view of the company's existing bad
credit. 94 Electricity rates were raised on a showing of increased
costs and a deficit, in the absence of evidence contrary to the financial
statement of petitioner.9 5 Sometimes rates are approved without any
reason at all being given for the decision.9 6 On the other hand, gas
rates have been lowered by reason of a fall in prices affecting oper97
ating expenses.
Although rates are thua often and justifiably determined without
resort to all the steps of the orthodox process, still in important contested cases it is advisable to go through the formal process so that
the commission's rates may have a better chance to survive judicial
review. Further, if in this state evidence on the matters involved in
the formal process so far as that process is prescribed by statute is
offered, the evidence must -be taken into account. 98
The North Carolina Commission has, in a few cases instituted
by utility companies or consumers resorted to an approximation of
this formal rate making process. 99 The writer has discovered no
instance in which the commission of this state on its own initiative
caused to be made its own valuation of any utility's property and
then fixed rates founded on this base. An often repeated charge
against the whole system of commission regulation is that whereas
the commissions were set up to act on their own initiative in protecting the public, they have become in practice judicial bodies waiting
for others to make complaints and bring cases before them. As far
as electric rates are concerned our commission has been open to such
a charge. The commission has not on its own initiative fixed rates
it appeared that the petition for the increase was reasonable. The look of informality in the action of the commission is sometimes due to brevity in the
reports; nevertheless it is plain that rate decisions are commonly made without
following out completely the formal process for arriving at reasonable rates.
" In re App. of Tide Water Power Co., id. at 18.
' In re Pet. of Piedmont Power & Light Co., id. at 37. The language of
the report is obscure with regard to the nature of the deficit. At all events
nothing was said about value, fair rate of return, etc.
I In re App. of Horton Tel. Co., id. at 12; In re App. of Franklin Light &
Power Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1919-20, Part 1, 7.
'In re Fixing of Rates, N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1921-22, Part 1, 25.
"IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1068.
'In re App. of the So. Power Co., supra note 63, sustained on appeal in
Corp. Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co, supra note 37, again before the commission,
In re Pet. of the So. Power Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1923-24, Part 1, 44;
City of Wilmington v. Tide Water Power Co., supra note 32.
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founded on evidence unearthed through its own investigations. 100
The small consumer of current is in no position to demonstrate that
electricity rates are unreasonable; evidence of the reasonableness of
rates for a utility of any size, including an appraisal of the utility
property, is exceedingly costly to obtain; therefore, save in those instances where some alert municipality has acted to represent its citizens by presenting and substantiating a rate complaint before the commission, 101 the case of the small consumer has in the past gone by
default.
There are a number of reasons for this inactivity. First, there
seems to have been a belief that prior to the expansion of the commission's power in 1931102 the commission had on authority on its
own initiative to fix rates, but was obliged to wait for complaints.1 03
If this was ever true 0 4 it is true no longer. 10 5 Second, funds for
the expensive work of conducting valuations have been lacking.1 0 6
Third, experience elsewhere with rate making founded on valuations
including cost of reproduction, as already pointed out, has not been
such as to stimulate optimism concerning its success.
Would it be desirable for the commission to value the properties
of electrical utilities and to fix rates calculated to allow a fair return
on those fair values above operating expenses, in view o1 the uncertainties in the process, the prospect of litigation contesting the results,
and the expense?107 Perhaps the commission should not attempt to
' The Associate Commissioners provided for under our present law are
frankly expected to act only in matters pending before the commission. The
initiative of the commission is centered in the Utilities Commissioner. P. L.
1933, c. 134, §10.

' City of Wilmington v. Tide Water Power Co., supra note 32.
".'P. L. 1931, c. 455.
'WADDELL, op. cit. supra note 89, at 8. Dr. Waddell states that "until
recently" the commission was not empowered to initiate rate proceedings "in a
wholesale manner" but was obliged to wait for petitions and complaints.
' See P. L. 1913, c. 127, §2, conferring on the commission control of electric
rates. The commission is given the same control as it already had over railroad rates. See for this authority N. C. Rmv. STAT. (1905) §§1099, 1106.

There appears to be nothing in the general grants of authority over rates to
justify the conclusion that the commission must wait for complaints.

' P. L. 1933, c. 307, §8.

" "This state never has made any expenditures for the setting up of values
of the particular utility properties through extensive appraisals," etc. N. C.
Corp. Comm. Rep. 1931-32, IX.
"' WADDzL, op. cit. supra note 89, at 600, sets forth estimates of the cost
of appraising the North Carolina properties of four large electric companies
operating in this state submitted by eight engineering concerns. The estimates
ran from $133,000 to $550,000, depending on the engineering concern and on
whether the inventory and appraisal was to be wholly independent or whether
it was to be a check of information given by the utilities. Dr. Waddell says,
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appraise all the property of all the utilities in the state.10 8 But when

the commission has reason to believe that the rates of some particular
utility are too high, the commission may well value its property and
fix its rates, not because there is any mathematical certainty that the
valuation will be accurate and the rates arrived at exactly what they
should be, but because rate fixing applied to the companies whose
rates are most objectionable is a means of putting pressure on all the
utilities to keep their rates within bounds. 09 Rate making under the
orthodox method is no application of a formula producing as an
answer the exactly fair rate. Nevertheless rate fixing is a means
whereby the public can keep pressure on the utilities to hold their
rates down. If pressure from representatives of the public were
abandoned, there is little doubt that many companies would take
advantage of their monopoly of an essential service to charge exorbitant rates.
INVESTIGATION, NEGOTIATION, AND COMPARATIVE RATES

There are other means of applying pressure to keep rates within
the limits of reasonableness. One is investigation. Official inquiry
into rates of utilities, and private research and dissemination of information, are indispensable means of making utility operators reluctant to overstep the bounds of fair dealing. Another Is negotiation." 0 The North Carolina Commission in 1932 by conference
[at 7] the appraisals would cost "possibly a half million dollars, require a year
or more to complete, afford no immediate relief, and, when completed, would
represent the opinion of one group of engineers and accountants to be contested by a like group followed by court complications dragging out through
the years."
'The
old Corporation Commission had ambitions in this direction. See
N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1931-32, IX.
'The General Assembly in 1933 made available, subject to the control of
designated state officers, the aggregate sum of $35,000 annually for investigation
of utilities, appraisals, audits, and determination of fair rate structures. P. L.
1933, c. 519. While this is not enough for valuations of all utility properties
in the state in the near future, it is enough to procure appraisals of particular
utilities whose rates may be thought too high.
It would be possible through appropriate legislation to solve the problem of
cost of rate fixing by assessing the cost against the utilities as an operating
expense. This cost would then be eventually paid by the consumer. It is reasonable that he should pay the cost of his own protection. A partial recognition
of this principle existed in N. C. CODE AwN. (Michie, 1931) §1032, repealed
by P. L. 1933, c. 134, §1. See also Ely, Federal and State Attitudes Toward
Public Utilities (1934) 13 P. U. FoRr. 283 at 288. For a specific illustration of
legislation embodying this principle see Vt. Laws 1925, No. 85, p. 127.
11
In re Conferences on Public Utility Rates and Service, N. C. Corp.
Comm. Rep. 1931-32, XVII. The commission points out that rate controversies
are expensive and subject to long delays, and advocates negotiations where
possible.
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with four of the large electrical utilities of the state secured rate
reductions estimated to produce an aggregate lowering of charges to
consumers of $1,167,000 per year.'1 x Negotiations are, of course,
stimulated by the commission's rate fixing authority left behind the
door.
Comparison of rates with other rates is a further source of pressure on utilities to keep their charges down.1 12 When the same comu N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1931-32, III and IV; WADDELL, op. cit. supra
note 89, at 2. Dr. Waddell estimates the total reductions at $1,107,000.
1' The latest North Carolina comparative rate study known to the writer is
that to be found in WADDELL, op. cit. supra note 89. Dr. Waddell makes a
study of electric rates, especially the residential rates of four large companies
operating in this state as compared with the average of residential rates charged
in the 177 cities of the United States having a population of over 50,000. From
Dr. Waddell's studies it appears that both before and after the rate changes of
the fall of 1932 (supra note 111), the North Carolina charges of three companies were higher for given amounts of electricity per month than in the
average of the 177 cities. See graphs, pages 10, 114, 223, 320 and 421.
Conclusions to be drawn from such comparisons should take into account
the usual differences under which companies operate, as pointed out in the text.
The validity of the comparison between charges of North Carolina companies
and average charges in 177 cities having a population of 50,000 or over depends
also on whether the rates for substantially all those cities are system-wide
rates charged by companies operating in those cities and in other less populous
territory, or whether there are a substantial number of instances where the
rates are city wide only. City wide rates are scarcely comparable to the
system-wide rates charged by one of the North Carolina companies involved.
Dr. Waddell's figures for the average of the 177 cities are taken from a
study made in 1932 under the direction of City Commissioner Geo. W. Page
by Mr. Otto P. Ortlieb, Engineer of Street Lighting of the City of Trenton,
N. J. The cities are listed by states, and the states by regions, such as New
England States, Middle Atlantic. States, etc. The charges per month for given
quantities of current are shown for each city, and the average for each area is
likewise shown. The average charges in the five North Carolina cities having
a population of 50,000 or over compared as follows with the average charges
for all such cities in the South Atlantic states:
K.W. used per mo.
N. C. Cities
South Atl. Cities
0
1.04
.91
10
1.10
1.08
20
1.69
1.71
30
2.40
2.39
40
3.02
3.02
50
3.64
3.64
80
5.38
4.86
100
6.49
5.72
Since this comparison rates both in North Carolina [supra note 111] and elsewhere have been reduced.
Anyone desiring to compare rates charged by a private company in any city
having a population of 20,000 or over with rates in other such cities anywhere
in the United States and Canada may do so by use of the rate book published
by the Edison Electric Institute, 420 Lexington Ave., N. Y. C. Therein he
will find rate schedules maintained in all such cities. From these schedules
he may calculate the cost for any given amounts of electricity per month !or
any purpose such as residential use, etc., in the various cities.
The Rankin-Norris resolution passed by Congress and signed by the Presi-
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pany supplies service both in North Carolina and another state it has
been suggested that lower rates in the other state may justify establishing the same rates here. 113 The difference between the rates of
one company and those of another within the same state is a fertile
source of investigations. Comparison of rates now with rates in the
past is likewise a regulatory force. 114 The urge responsible for present movements for rate reductions is the belief that if rates five years
ago were reasonable, then the present rates under a depressed general
level of prices are too high. Comparisons betwen rates in one state
and average rates elsewhere also perform a function. If the comparison is unfavorable, this may be the source of public clamor which
pushes the commission into activity. Further, the action taken by
the commission is likely to be influenced by the same comparison. 11
Of course, comparisons are not always fair. It may be more expensive to supply service in one state or locality than in another.
Availability of water power, distance to coal fields, density of population, the type of demand, the physical character of the region over
which the lines extend, and other factors all contribute to justifiable
differences in rates. 116 Nevertheless, if one company charges more
than another, the question why is likely to be raised, and justification
required. If rates in one state are higher than in others, the same
result follows. This enables states having weak commissions to hitch
hike at the expense of states where regulation is more efficient. The
efficient states succeed in-keeping rates reasonable. Companies operdent April 14, directs the Federal Power Commission to investigate and com-

pile electric rates throughout the country. N. Y. Times, April 15, 1934, at 8.
From the resultant compilations it will doubtless be possible to make ready
comparisons between charges anywhere in force and charges for similar service anywhere else in the country.
' Corp. Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co., supra note 37, at 30. See also the
concurring opinion of Clark, C. J., at 36.
u'N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1921-22, 3. The commission speaks of authority,
"to adjust public utility rates as the cost of rendering such service may advance or decline."
"'For an instance of a frank undertaking to adjust rates in this state on
the basis of average rates elsewhere, with allowances for local conditions, see
WADDEL, op. cit. supra note 89, 7, 8. On one occasion the North Carolina
Board, of Railroad Commissioners sustained against complaint certain freight
and passenger rates partly by comparison with previous rates and with rates
elsewhere. In re Assessment and Taxation, and Revision of Freight and
Passenger Tariffs, N. C. Board of R. R. Commissioners Rep. 1897, 468. In

its report for 1931-32, page VII, the Corporation Commission states that it
has under consideration telephone rates, and then inserts extensive tables showing rates in North Carolina and four neighboring states.
'See In re Pet. of So. Power Co., sra note 99, at 46; WADDELL, Op. Cit.
supra note 89, at 401, 404, 405.
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ating in states where regulation is weak cannot charge too much
more than these reasonable rates without attracting attention.
If rates in one state are higher than in others this may be evidence
that they are too high; but a slender protection to the public is offered by such comparisons. The average of rates elsewhere may be
too high, also, due to the failure of commissions generally to function
according to expectations, a failure which has caused a nationwide
seething of discontent with existing utility regulation, and has produced an outburst of legislation to improve it.117
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP

The spirit of the times has made more formidable than ever another force which helps to keep utility rates in check. That force is
public ownership. It has recently made tremendous gains. 118 Production and sale of electricity under public ownership acquired prestige with the passage of the "Tennessee Valley Authority Act of
1933,119 setting up a corporation, the board of directors of which are
appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate,' 20 to which corporation are intrusted electricity producing properties of the United States Government at Muscle Shoals.' 2 ' The corporation is to hold other such
properties to be constructed elsewhere.' 2 2 It is given power to construct dams, reservoirs, power houses, power structures, transmission
lines and indidental works "in the Tennessee River and its tribn'Burgess, Recent Trends in Public Utility Regulation (1933), a paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools,
and available in pamphlet form. Mr. Burgess says, page 1, "Certain it is that
the past year has witnessed the placing upon the statute books of our several
states of more new utility regulations than in any other year during the last
twenty." See also Rooks and Booth, Current Problems of Public Utility Rate
Regulation (1933), a paper presented at the same meeting.
Mr. David E. Lilienthal, Power Director of the Tennessee Valley Authority, in an Associated Press article dated at Washington, Feb. 17, 1934, points
to a growing conviction that regulation by commissions has proved inadequate
and says that Congress passed the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, post note
119, to supplement such regulation.
'Legislatures in seventeen states at their recent sessions passed laws designed to further ownership and operation of utility plants by states, counties,
or cities. Burgess, supra note 117, at 2. See alo the Tennessee Valley
Authority Act, post note 119; and the report of Mr. Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Cobrdinator of Transportation, N. Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1934, at 26, expressing the belief that the ultimate solution of the railroad problem will be
public ownership and operation.
m48 STAT. 58 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. §831 (Supp. 1933).
"Id. §2a.
-Id. §7a.
=Id.§§17, 18.
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utaries."'123 The corporation is to perform numerous functions, including the manufacture of fertilizer and explosives, improvement of
navigation, and flood control. Surplus power is to be sold, and in
the sale of current preference is to be given to states, counties,
municipalities, and coperatives not organized or doing business for
profit, but primarily for the purpose of supplying electricity to their
own citizens or members. 124 This declared policy of giving a preference to states, counties, and especially municipalities, over private
companies, is a tonic to public ownership of distributing systems.
Moreover, the incorporation into the new national program of this
scheme for government production of electricity on a large scale is
a countrywide stimulant to public ownership.
The presence of public ownership and the threat of its expansion
is a virile regulatory influence on private companies. Commission
control is artificial; and it may itself be controlled or circumvented. 25
The danger of public ownership operates directly on the frame of
mind of the private utility owners, and gives them a motive for
desiring to serve well and cheaply.
A second fashion in which public ownership makes good its claim
to be included as a means of regulating privately owned electric systems is by furnishing a yardstick wherewith to measure the rates and
service of fhe privately owned plants.12 6 If municipal rates are
1 31d. §41.
Id. §§10, 11.
126The assertion is becoming popular that utilities control the government
machinery which controls them. See Levitt, supra note 67; Lilienthal, mipra
note 117. This popular belief may gain impetus from the recent sensational
disclosure by the Federal Trade Commission of "apparently compromising
correspondence" between a New York state legislator and a public utility company. N. Y. Times, April 1, 1934, at 1 and 2.
'The
recent North Carolina requirement [P. L. 1933, c. 307, §34] that
municipalities supplying certain types of utility service, including electricity,
file reports with the Utilities Commission giving the same information as that
required from private utilities, should be valuable as a means for making
comparison with private plants easier.
WADDELL, op. cit. supra note 89, at 506 sets forth a graph of monthly
charges for quantities of current from 10 to 100 kwhr in the average of 41
North Carolina municipalities owning generating or distributing systems, as
compared with average charges made by private plants in the 177 cities of over

50,000 reported in ORmiER, op. cit. supra note 112, and with charges in the 13

such cities which own municipal plants. The latter charges are also reported
by Ortlieb. The graph shows the charges for the North Carolina municipal
systems to be much higher for any quantity of current than the charges for
the 177 cities. The comparison is not strong evidence against the municipal
plants, however, because the figures used on the graph for the municipal systems are the figures for residence lighting (this may be seen by comparing the
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lower than company rates the companies are called upon to explain.
Unfortunately, many if not most municipal plants fail to function as
yardsticks. Comparisons between different utilities are always hampered by dissimilarities in conditions, as already outlined. Comparisons between private plants and public plants are hindered by additional dissimilarities. In some municipalities rates are higher than
the usual company rates in comparable cities because the municipal
plants are made to pay a portion of the expense of the city government. Thus users of electricity are raided for the benefit of the taxpayers. In other municipalities rates are lower than the usual company rates, but investigation shows that the municipal plant pays no
taxes 127 or less taxes than a private plant would pay, and that the
bonds of the municipal plant are obligations of the city, thus enabling
the municipal plant to borrow money cheaply by making it a present
of the credit of the taxpayers. Further, the rates of a private company may be fixed for the whole system supplying an area including
much lean territory where towns are small- and customers few. It
is hardly fair to compare the rates in some large city served by the
company with the rates in a similar city served by a municipal plant,
which plant serves the city only. Its rates are not the average rates
for a whole area, but the rates for a select spot. 128 Conversely, the
municipal rates in some poor little town should not be compared
with the rates of a private company for some town equally poor and
little, when the company rates are system rates for a whole area
averaging much richer and giving the company the advantage of
large scale production besides. Comparison between rates under
municipal ownership and private ownership is a valuable means of
measuring the reasonableness of the private rates only where the
table of residential lighting rates, p. 505, with the graph), whereas the rates

for the 177 cities are for ordinary domesfic purposes. ORTLIEn, page 1.
It is more significant that the graph shows the charges for the 177 cities
were higher for each quantity of current considered than the charges for the
municipal plants in the 13 cities of over 50,000. The rates for the 177 cities
having private plants and the 13 cities having municipal plants are for the
same type of service, namely current for ordinary domestic purposes.
' See Elizabeth City Water & Power Co. v. Elizabeth City, supra note 41.
Plaintiff water company sought to enjoin defendant city from performing certain acts connected with the. erection of a municipal plant, and set up, among
other matters, that the municipal plant would offer unfair competition because
plaintiff was obliged to pay taxes which the municipal plant would not pay.
The court properly held that this was no ground for an injunction.

Never-

theless the company's plaint that the municipal plant had an unfair advantage
is genuine. Municipal plants should pay taxes.
'Balanced against this advantage is the company's large scale production.
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private systems and the municipal systems are operating under comparable conditions. 12 9
North Carolina has given all cities and towns 8 0 authority to own
and operate electric systems.18 1 Bonds for the cost of plants may
be issued without a popular vote.' 3 2 The municipality does not impair the obligation of an existing franchise by establishing a municipal system, if the franchise is not exclusive. 133 The current from
the system may be furnished beyond the municipal boundaries. The
statute so providing does not limit the distance the municipal lines
may go outside the boundaries.' 3 4 This extraterritorial power is
One of the purposes of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, supra note
119, is to furnish a yardstick to measure the reasonableness of the rates of
private companies. Lilienthal, supra note 117; Levitt, supra note 67. The
yardstick must be used with care or private utilities will be declared short
whereas in truth the yardstick is five feet long. In the first place the Tennessee
Valley Authority (T. V. A.) is authorized by section 15 of the act to issue
bonds on the credit of the United States, bearing not more than 3312% interest.
Further, by section 14 the value of the T. V. A. facilities is to be "allocated
and charged up to (1) flood control, (2) navigation, (3) fertilizer, (4) national
defense, and (5) the development of power." If in determining cost of current the cost of each dam and plant is to be distributed among these items and
only a portion considered in cost of electricity, then that electricity can be
sold at rates not comparable to private rates. Private companies cannot in
this fashion kill several birds with one stone thus reducing the cost per bird.
For a round criticism of the T. V. A. yardstick from the private utility viewpoint, see Lawrence, Utility Investments under the Birchrod and Yardstick
(1933) 12 P. U. FORT. 689.
N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§2777, 2786.
Id. §§2787-3, 2807, 2832. Waddell found in this state 9 municipally owned
generating plants, and 38 municipally owned distributing systems retailing current purchased wholesale from private power companies. WADDELL, op. Cit.
supra note 89, at 501. The North Carolina Local Government Commission has
recently approved a bond issue of $746,000 for the city of Lexington to be
spent largely in erecting a municipal steam plant for generating electricity.
The Federal Public Works Administration will be asked to finance the project.
(1934) 13 P. U. FORT. 127.
'Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029 (1903), overruling
earlier cases; Elizabeth City Water & Power Co. v. Elizabeth City, supra note
41. The expense is a necessary one within N. C. CoNsT., Art. VII, §7.
Hill v. Elizabeth City, 291 Fed. 194 (E.D. N. C. 1923), af'd. 298 Fed.
67 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924).
'

N'.C.

CoDE ANN.

(Michie, 1931) §2807. The right to furnish current

beyond the municipal limits applies although the municipality operates only a
distributing system. Holmes v. City of Fayetteville, 197 N. C. 740, 150 S.E.
624 (1929), dismissed for lack of a Federal question, 281 U. S.700, 50 Sup.
353, 74 L. ed. 1126 (1930).
In spite of this general statilte, passed in1929, authorizing service outside
the municipal limits, the legislature continues to empower by special legislation
particular municipalities to extend lines beyond the boundaries. Priv. L. 1931,
c.65, empowers the Town of Tarboro to extend itselectric system beyond the
corporate limits without restriction as to distance. Pub. Local L. 1931, c. 31,
grants to municipal electric plants in Beaufort County authority to extend
their lines into territory within Beaufort and adjoining counties.
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important, since private companies are finding it profitable to organize large systems serving many localities. The publicly owned plants
will be less effective if held in the strait jackets of municipal boundaries. The regulatory force of potential public ownership in this
state would be given additional vigor by general laws permitting
combinations of municipalities to operate systems, or authorizing the
operation of systems over large areas by special regional bodies. 135
Such expansion of the legal machinery for public ownership could be
safeguarded by statutory provisions for the administration of all
public plants, freeing the managers so far as possible from local
politics.'2 6 A state agency already exists which would hold in check
bond issues for erecting and extending the systems,1 37 thus curbing
the exuberance of municipal promoters.
"'See Guild, Special Municipal Corporations (1929) 18 NAT. MUN. Rxv.
319; Burgess, supra note 117, at 2. Mr. Burgess speaks of recently enactedstate statutes "authorizing public utility districts for the ownership and operation of public utility plants, or ownership and operation by the state itself."
Means for accomplishing this purpose to some extent are specified qualifications designed to keep out all except trained men, selection of managers by
boards serving without pay after the model of school boards, independence of
the managers from political bodies of the local government, adequate salaries
and long terms. The writer believes that divorce of management from politics
could be furthered by appointing the managers for an indefinite period, and
then submitting to the voters at long intervals the single question, "Shall the
present manager of the municipal utility be retained?" Until a negative vote
no one would be permitted to offer himself or anyone else as a candidate for
manager. Thus no one would ever "run against" a manager, and the voters
could pass on his competence as a single issue.
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2492(1)-2--,92(51).

